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Preserving the Subject
Im m anuel Kant founds his artistic theory on the m odel o f the aesthetic 
genius who creates a rt works that can be universally dec lared  to be beau ti­
ful. In o rd e r to qualify as genius, the artist necessarily possesses bo th  form al 
train ing, which is learned , and  innate  originality, which can n o t be  taught. 
Interestingly, Ju lia  Kristeva parallels this m odel with her use o f the symbolic 
an d  the  sem iotic. This p ap e r will exam ine the co rresp o n d en ce  betw een 
K ant’s n o tion  o f the artistic genius, and  Kristeva’s theory o f  art, an d  the dif­
fering  im plications o f each position. K ant’s system is based u p o n  a unified  
ego which can conclusively ju d g e  the status o f  an  art work. K ant seeks to 
universally classify certain  a rt works as beautiful, and  founds this universal­
ity o f  ju d g m e n t on the  biologically p re d e te rm in ed  ta len t o f  th e  genius. 
Kristeva rejects K ant’s h ierarchy o f the  genius and  prioritizes the subjectiv­
ity o f the creative process, ra th e r than  the beautifu l status o f  the a r t p ro d ­
uct. Kristeva’s fragm ented  subject re-engages with the symbolic th ro u g h  art 
to recap tu re  m ean ing  that has been lost due  to the overw helm ing univer­
sal. T he universal status o f b o th  the work o f art and  the ta len t o f  the  genius 
are  den ied , an d  lose their im portance. T he priority, for Kristeva, is to  allow 
the artist to escape the totalizing universal o f the symbolic, while sim ulta­
neously recognizing its im portance in the constitu tion  o f the  subject.
K ant’s Artist as Genius
In  the Critique o f Pure Judgement, Im m anuel K ant bases his aesthe tic  
theory  on the defin ition  o f the artist as genius. T he aesthetic genius creates 
fine a rt which incites the im agination and  und erstan d in g  to free play, with­
o u t the use o f concepts. T he beautifu l object p rom otes a subjective univer­
sal response to the work. T he reaction  to the work is subjective because it 
concerns the feelings and  does n o t involve concepts, bu t universal because 
the response will be the same for all, provided tha t one has n o t developed 
p o o r em otional habits. Exclusively, the genius a lone is able to c reate  the 
objects tha t p rom ote  the universal ju d g m en t o f beauty in  the  viewer. How­
ever, the artist does n o t con tribu te  personally to the work, o r seek to com-
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m unicate  to the viewer. T he gen ius’ con tribu tion  is restric ted  to actualizing 
the  beautifu l an d  is gu ided  by this telos.
K ant’s genius is com posed o f two determ inative aspects. T he artistic 
genius m ust possess taste, which is the form al train ing  tha t orders the work. 
This technically trained  skill structures the a rtw o rk  and  provides the m eans 
by which the artist can p roduce the beautiful p roduct. However, the m ore 
fundam ental aspect that defines the artist as genius is inborn  originality. Kant 
describes this ta len t as »...the innate  m ental ap titude (» ingenium«) through 
which n a tu re  gives the ru le  to art.«1 Because the beautiful does n o t have a 
concept, the gen ius’ originality also canno t fall u n d e r a concep t th a t can be 
exp lained  o r taught. Consequently, the artist does n o t u n d erstan d  the p ro ­
cess o f creation  o r w here the ideas tha t gu ide the w ork arise from . K ant 
believes bo th  aspects, originality and  skill, are necessary for the success o f 
the  genius. M echanical a rt lacks originality an d  can n o t be considered  fine 
a rt because it is m erely technical skill and  is spiritless. However, this techn i­
cal skill is need ed  because the genius can n o t guide the originality towards 
the  beautifu l w ithout it. T he gen ius’ works serve as m odels o f creativity to 
o th e r artists, b u t these works canno t be m erely copied o r im itated. They can 
only po in t the way towards w hat an artw ork  should  be like. Individuals m ust 
find  th e ir  own expression  o f this ineffable ta len t, if they possess it. Kant 
stresses th a t genius is ra re  because innate  originality belongs only to a few.
Symbolic and Semiotic
Ju lia  Kristeva asserts tha t there  is m ore to aesthetic theory  than  restric­
tive definitions o f the artist, o r the art work they are able to produce. In o rd e r 
to u n d erstan d  h e r aesthetic thought, it is necessary to address h e r overall 
project. Kristeva founds subjectivity on a psychoanalytic m odel, and  although 
psychoanalysis may be problem atic, its difficulties are beyond the scope o f 
this paper. Kristeva believes th a t initially, the in fan t is unable to concep tual­
ize itself as d ifferen t from  its m other. In the m irro r stage, the child  recog­
nizes its separateness, b u t this is based on  the illusion tha t it is in d ep en d en t, 
w hen in actuality it is still d ep e n d en t on the »m other« o r the prim ary care­
giver for survival. In the thetic stage, the child begins to actively use language, 
an d  ex ternal objects are now posited  as d ifferen t from  the child  an d  are 
them atized. T he child  can conceptualize the difference betw een itself and  
outside objects an d  language verbalizes this difference. A lthough the  child
1 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952) 168.
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is always already in a world o f language, it is here  tha t the  child  uses it for 
the first time to express personal needs to the m o ther who is now recognized 
as separate. T h e  symbolic, o r w hat Kristeva calls the  law o f the »father« be­
com es actively a part o f the child. T he symbolic is n o t only language, b u t 
the cu ltural norm s and  laws o f society.
However, the symbolic is n o t totally adequate because the en gagem en t 
with the form al structures o f language can n o t express all th a t one  needs to 
say. Kristeva believes there are preverbal rhythm s and  gestures in significa­
tion which she nam es the semiotic. T hro u g h  the sem iotic, affect an d  bodily 
drives are p resent in language. A lthough ineffable, the semiotic is w hat drives 
language, while the symbolic provides the form al structure . T he symbolic 
and  the sem iotic are both  m odalities o f the sam e signifying process which 
together m ake up  signification. T he sem iotic, however, is n o t sublated  in to  
the symbolic, b u t transgresses the symbolic and  breeches it, ra ther than  posits 
itself. Kristeva describes this as the sem iotic splitting the thetic o r as an  ex­
plosion o f the sem iotic in the symbolic, and  she insists this is n o t a H egelian  
sublation. »It is, instead, a transgression o f position, a reversed reactivation 
o f the con trad iction  tha t institu ted  this very position.«2 Instead  o f  a synthe­
sis, the expression o f the sem iotic is a d isruption  and  a sp litting  o f  the sym­
bolic. T he sem iotic exceeds the symbolic, and  bo th  aspects are n ee d ed  for 
signification.
Kristeva’s use o f the symbolic and  the sem iotic are co n n ec ted  to h e r 
defin ition  o f the subject as a decen tered , fragm ented  being  whose bo rders 
are  always uncerta in . Initially, the self is n o t posited until th ere  is a recogni­
tion o f the o therness o f the »mother.« T he subject is tied to a re la tion  with 
another, which elim inates a fundam en tal unity to subjectivity. Subjectivity 
is gained th ro u g h  the recognition  o f the o therness o f the »m other« , b u t it 
is a subjectivity based up o n  a loss. T here  is a gap between the oneness o f the 
ideal re la tion  with the m other, and  the recognition  o f the split in to  a sepa­
rate individual. T he separation itself is also based on an illusion because the 
child has years o f dependency  left with the m other. Because the subject is 
fo u n d ed  on  a re la tion  with an  o th e r and  because this re la tio n  is initially 
based u p o n  a fabrication, the cen te r o f the subject is always in question. 
Language is engaged  to com m unicate the needs o f the subject who is no  
longer in u n io n  with the m other, b u t language also reflects the fragm enta­
tion o f the self. T he self is m ade up  o f an  aspect which is always already part 
o f  a society o f laws and  language, or the symbolic. However, th ere  is particu ­
larity and  uniqueness to the self th a t language can n o t con tain  an d  the uni-
2 Kristeva, Julia, The Portable Kristeva, ed. Kelly Oliver (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1997), Revolution in Poetic Language 55.
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versai rules can n o t incorporate , which is the sem iotic. Kristeva suggests that 
the  self is com posed o f bo th  universal and  particu lar aspects an d  the exact 
b o rders betw een them  can n o t be established.
T he oppositions in Kristeva’s thought, the universal and  the particu ­
lar, the objective and  the subjective, the m ind  and  the body, the symbolic 
an d  the sem iotic are always in tertw ined and  can n o t be separated  o r exist 
w ithout the other. »Because the subject is always both sem iotic and symbolic, 
n o  signifying system he p roduces can be e ith e r ‘exclusively’ sem iotic o r ‘ex­
clusively’ symbolic, an d  is instead necessarily m arked  by an indeb tedness to 
bo th .« 3 T he subject is m anifestly all these oppositions an d  it is u n clea r as to 
w here the borders actually lie. Kristeva states:
T he subject is no t simply an inside facing the referential outside. The 
subjective s tru c tu re , u n d e rs to o d  as a specific a rticu la tio n  o f the 
relationship between speaking subject and Other, determ ines the very 
situation of reality, its existence or nonexistence, its overturn ing  or 
hypostasis. In such a perspective, ontology becomes subordinate to the 
signifying structure that sustains a given subject in its transference upon 
the O ther.4
C onfusion concern ing  the location o f the borders o f inside an d  o u t­
side can lead to various psychological problem s which expression o r com ­
m unication  can alleviate. Art, fo r Kristeva, has to do with the re la tionsh ip  
to  language and  how the subject negotiates the b lu rred  borders o f o n e ’s 
make-up.
Kristeva’s aesthetic theory  is intricately co n n ected  to the re la tionsh ip  
between the symbolic and  semiotic. In Revolution and Poetic Language, Kristeva 
ex p la in s  » th o u g h  abso lu te ly  necessary, the  th e tic  is n o t exclusive: th e  
sem iotic, which also precedes it, constantly tears it open , and  this transgres­
sion brings ab o u t all the various transform ations o f the signifying practice 
tha t are called ‘c rea tio n ’.«s T he a rtis t’s re la tionsh ip  to the symbolic in  the 
thetic stage may n o t be firmly established and  the symbolic can lose its m ean­
ing  because the sem iotic fails to be expressed. Particularly with poetic lan­
guage, b u t also with o th e r form s o f art, the sem iotic rup tu res and  restruc­
tures the symbolic. Poetic language transgresses the symbolic, an d  creates 
som eth ing  new. T he artist is th en  able to re-engage with the symbolic and  
recap tu re  m eaning, b u t only th ro u g h  creating  a new re la tionship  to lan ­
guage. A rt is n o t the only rem edy for the fragm en ted  self which m ust sig­
nify. Kristeva believes psychotherapy and  religion also provide alternative
3 Kristeva, The Portable Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language?)^.
4 Kristeva, Julia, Tales of Love, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987) 274.
5 Kristeva, The Portable Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language 50.
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ways to express the conditions o f a m isrelation in the thetic stage. U nlike 
psychotherapy, aesthetic creation does n o t resolve the sub ject’s cond ition , 
b u t provides the opportun ity  for catharsis, and  has a political po ten tia l in 
its ability to transgress and  transform  the symbolic, o r the cultural norm s and  
laws th a t ru le  society. Two conditions o f the thetic stage associated with an  
a r tis tic  te m p e ra m e n t a re  w hat sh e  calls m e la n c h o ly /d e p re s s io n  a n d  
abjection, b u t it m ust be stressed tha t a rt is n o t the result o f  a psychological 
p rob lem  specific to an  individual, b u t the resu lt o f the universal cond ition  
o f fragm en ted  subjecthood.
Art as Universal vs. Art as Individual
Because creativity occurs th rough  the signification o f the symbolic and  
the sem iotic, a striking parallel can be m ade to K ant’s system. Even though  
the two theoretical positions do n o t perfectly  m ap on  to o n e  ano ther, there  
is general ag reem en t towards the factors which constitu te creativity. Forced 
to align with Kant, Kristeva’s symbolic corresponds to the form al technical 
tra in ing  o f the genius that is necessary to create beautifu l objects. K an t’s 
form al rules th a t structu re  the a rtw o rk  co rrespond  to Kristeva’s laws o f the 
symbolic. T he innate  originality o f K ant’s genius aligns with the sem iotic. 
A lthough the sem iotic is n o t innate  for Kristeva because it is always already 
b o u n d  up  with the symbolic, it is ineffable, like K ant’s originality, an d  it gives 
the spark to the work o f art that Kant describes as the soul o f  the work. K ant’s 
genius as partly  ru le-governed and  partly beyond rules, m irro rs  n o t only 
Kristeva’s use o f the symbolic and  the sem iotic, b u t also Kristeva’s m odel o f 
creativ ity  w h ich  n eed s  b o th  p a r tic u la r  an d  u n iversa l asp ec ts  th a t  a re  
g ro u n d ed  in the individual subject. Creativity for Kristeva com es ab o u t due 
to an inability to u n d erstan d  the self. T he form al rules o f the  symbolic are 
the universal laws o f a system which all individuals are b o u n d  up  in and  m ust 
use in o rd e r to engage with their society. T he sem iotic an d  K ant’s orig inal­
ity are the ineffable particularity  d istinct to the individual. K ant’s o rig inal­
ity differs from  the sem iotic in that it only belongs to a few, an d  w hat it can 
accom plish is based on a universal no tion  o f the beautiful, lim iting the power 
o f the individual. T he rhythm s and  gestures th a t Kristeva speaks of, are al­
ways already w ithin the structures o f  the symbolic, b u t re ta in  th e ir radically 
particu lar natu re .
Obviously, Kant would deny a com parison with Kristeva’s subject. K ant’s 
subject is n o t fragm ented , and  the re la tion  betw een the universal an d  par­
ticu lar aspects o f  the self are n o t fou n d ed  on  a split ego fo r Kant. K ant’s
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transcendental unity o f appercep tion  gathers the m anifolds o f in tu ition  and 
the  u n d ers tan d in g  in to  a un ified  self. A lthough this subject does n o t know 
itself in itself, it is still one  distinct subject w hich gathers sensation an d  u n ­
d erstan d in g  to g eth er in one location and  orders space and  time. T he unifi­
cation o f the self as empirically real to itself ties K ant’s whole picture together. 
If  the self is n o t unified, K ant’s en tire  p henom ena l w orld is lost.
Subsequently, the  p ro d u c t o f art betw een Kant and  Kristeva is also dif­
feren t. K an t’s genius expresses n o th in g  o f the self, while Kristeva’s artist 
expresses the self m ore fully than  anywhere else, except in psychoanalysis. 
K ant’s genius is gu ided  by the object o f  the beautiful, while Kristeva seeks 
to express the self th rough  a re-engagem ent with the symbolic. In  Abjection, 
Melancholia, and Love, Jo h n  Lechte describes Kristeva’s view o f the a rt p ro d ­
uct n o t as the creation  o f an  object, bu t m ore o f a process which »...’crea tes’ 
the  subject.«1' T h ro u g h  the a rt work, the artist recreates the self by express­
ing  the fundam en tal contrad ictions o f the constitu tion  o f the subject. T he 
a r t ob ject is n o t m eaningless, because it does express m ood an d  com m uni­
cates to the  viewer who may use the work for the very sam e therapeu tic  rea­
sons. However, the priority  for Kristeva always seems to be the preservation 
o f the particularity  o f  the individual th rough  the work and  the therapeu tic  
an d  healing  function  o f art. R ather than  stress the universal beauty  o f an 
object, Kristeva is m ore in terested  in preserving the subject.
D espite their d ifference o f approach , b o th  K ant and  Kristeva find  a 
social function  for the work o f art. Kant connects the ability to ju d g e  the 
beautifu l with open ing  oneself up  to correct m oral feelings. O bserving the 
work o f a r t helps individuals to align themselves with the m oral law by p ro ­
m oting  app ro p ria te  feelings. Kant uses the privileged originality o f  the  art­
ist to justify the universality o f the beautiful object and  the correc t feelings 
it is able to produce. Why this artistic talent is rare  is unexplained . T he com ­
m unal benefit is tha t we are able to open  ourselves to the p ro p e r feelings 
in  appreciating  the beautiful, which will help  us to guide o u r em otions to­
wards acting  m orally and  w ithin the symbolic law. In this way, a rt assists the 
m oral realm  an d  supports the universality o f the symbolic order.
Kristeva takes an opposite tack on the issue. She sees the ability o f  art 
to d isrup t the symbolic in its capacity to com m unicate both  the symbolic and  
the  sem iotic. T he political w orth o f art is th a t it saves the individual from  
being  totalized by society. T he artist transgresses the symbolic, and  in do ­
ing  so re-engages with it. T he individual artist is saved from  being abject, or
f’ John Lechte, »Art, Love, and Melancholy in the Work of Julia Kristeva«, Abjection, 
Melancholia, and Love: the Work of Julia Kristeva, eds.John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin 
(London: Routledge, 1990) 24.
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outside the law, and  is able to recap tu re lost m eaning. For Kristeva, individu­
ality and  particularity  is preserved an d  expressed in  the w ork o f art. Ju s t as 
the goal o f psychoanalysis is n o t to totalize the individual by telling them  what 
they are like, b u t to »...help them , then , to  speak and  w rite them selves in 
unstable, open , undecidable spaces«,7 art fulfills the sam e function . It helps 
the individual to build  a space of o n e ’s own. Kristeva describes each psycho­
analytic trea tm en t as un ique, and  in tha t sense, as analogous to a work o f 
a rt.8 Likewise, the a rt work is un ique and  preserves som eth ing  o f  the  ind i­
vidual com ing to term s with a system an d  w orld which is always already p art 
o f the subject.
The Hierarchy of the Genius
T h ere  is a h ierarchy  im plied by K ant’s n o tion  o f the genius w hich dis­
tinguishes the genius as superio r based on  innate ta lent w hich belongs only 
to a few. Biologically de term ined  as superior, the  genius is able to create 
beautifu l objects provided tha t he  trains an d  structures his talent. C hristine 
Battersby correctly points ou t in h e r book Gender and Genius tha t historically, 
the no tion  o f genius excludes wom en. T he power in the w ord »genius« n o t 
only determ ines the status o f a work as fine art, b u t was »...evoked to explain 
the difference betw een civilized m an and  both  anim als an d  savages.«9 Ge­
nius exem plified  the  p innacle o f h um an  achievem ent. A lthough the con­
cep t o f  genius changed  over time, it was based on  exclusion betw een ind i­
viduals and  never included women. This logic of exclusion asserted the n o n ­
genius to be lacking, and  especially so fo r w om en who never h ad  such a 
po ten tia l.10 Battersby’s m ain com plain t is the term  »genius« »...dress(es) up  
evaluation as descrip tion« ,11 cleverly h id ing  its power.
However, Battersby suggests th a t w hat is now n eed ed  is the  ability to 
see w om en as geniuses. She seeks to validate fem ale artists an d  re n d e r  them  
visible, b u t she re ta ins the inheren tly  h ierarch ical co n cep t o f genius and  
adapts it to be app lied  to w om en as well. T he sense she re ta ins o f the  w ord 
»genius« is o f a person ju d g ed  against h e r culture o r trad ition  and  Battersby 
rejects all o th e r definitions o f  the word as contam inated. »The genius is the
7 Kristeva, Tales o f Love 380.
8 Kristeva, The Portable Kristeva, New M aladies o f  the Soul 21V.
9 Battersby, Christine, Gender and Genius (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) 
3.
10 Battersby 3.
11 Battersby 10.
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person  whose work (a) m arks the boundary  betw een the old ways an d  the 
new  within the trad ition , an d  (b) has lasting value and  significance.«12 T he 
genius is no  lo n g er a type o f elite being, b u t only one  who stands o u t as 
com pared  to h e r cu lture. T he term  becom es evaluative instead o f descrip­
tive. Battersby claims that in o rd e r for a w om an’s art to be respected , she 
m ust be able to be com pared  with the historical and  cultural context in o rd e r 
to situate h e r  w ithin the tradition . She denies a  special psychological state 
o r special class o f person  in tune with the unconscious, b u t she believes we 
can still praise and  rank  wom en pragmatically.
Even ignoring  the pragm atic difficulty o f  d eterm in ing  ta len t in o n e ’s 
own age o r w hat the status o f  an  a rt work has over tim e, Battersby’s defin i­
tion  o f »genius« problem atically retains its hierarchical structure. A lthough 
h e r  view endorses a less exclusive use o f the term , it seems to be sacrificing 
the  very p rob lem  Battersby is trying to correct. W om en w ould be rightfully 
recogn ized  for th e ir ta len t, b u t the im plicit elitism  o f  the  term  »genius« 
justifies a supposedly quick and  easy categorization o f individuals based on 
th e ir perceived re la tion  to the cu ltu re  at large. Instead  o f p resen ting  a con ­
tinuum  o f ta len t tha t recognizes individuality, Battersby retains som ew hat 
exclusive overtones o f the genius thatjustify an objective categorization, and  
raises the status o f som e wom en while negating  the status o f others.
Kristeva’s artistic theory  allows for the possibility o f  trea ting  a rt works 
a n d  artists individually. T h e  con cep tio n  o f a r t is sim ilar in Kristeva an d  
Battersby in  tha t g reat a r t always surpasses the culture, b u t for Kristeva, the 
symbolic is d isrup ted  in the instance o f art an d  the cu ltu re  is surpassed in 
an  entirely  d ifferen t m anner. Battersby’s »genius« surpasses the established 
symbolic system o f a rt because o f the exceptional n a tu re  o f the work. At the 
sam e tim e, the »genius« reinforces the p resen t symbolic system and  is re in ­
co rp o ra ted  at a h ig h er level. Kristeva’s artist ru p tu res the symbolic, an d  can 
actually change it. T he symbolic system influences the work because it guides 
w hat c an n o t be said, and  m ust be expressed in an o th e r m anner, b u t it does 
n o t d e term in e  the quality o f  a rt in an  objective m anner. Artists are trea ted  
individually for Kristeva. Potentially aesthetic activity is within the reach  o f 
everyone because it is an  expression o f a fragm ented  self and  a signifying 
system th a t does n o t always cap tu re  w hat we n eed  to say. It no  longer m at­
ters if a rt work is genius, provided tha t the person  re-engages with society 
an d  is in  som e sense healed , if only cathartically. G ood a r t allows the viewer 
o r aud ience  to partake in this com m unication, b u t the value o f the a rt no  
lo n g er lies entirely  in the  object produced .
12 Battersby 157.
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Conclusion
Kristeva does n o t locate art in a h ierarchy o f genius, b u t finds the source 
o f creativity to be in the fragm ented  constitu tion  o f the subject. Because o f 
the loss o f  the m other, and  the necessary engagem ent with the symbolic, one 
creates in o rd e r to work ou t the problem s associated with the  thetic phase. 
A lthough Kristeva’s s tructu re o f language as consisting o f the symbolic and  
the sem iotic co rrespond  to K ant’s twofold definition o f the genius, a rt is n o t 
cen te red  in the  object. T he m ore im p o rtan t aspect is th a t the artist is able 
to re-engage with the symbolic and  sim ultaneously d isrup t it. A rt is a th era­
p eu tic  expression o f individuality, w here, despite the frag m en ta tio n  and  
b lu rred  bo rders  o f the su b jec t/o b jec t re la tion , som eth ing  o f  the individual 
is preserved. A rt provides the same function  for the viewer, an d  in the  case 
o f literary work, »...textual experience represen ts one o f the m ost daring  
explorations the subject can allow himself, one that delves in to  his constitu­
tive process.«13 T he im portance o f the a rt p ro d u c t as a universal ob ject o f 
beauty drops away, as well as K ant’s categorization o f the genius as objectively 
talented . Kristeva ru p tu res bo th  o f these categories in o rd e r to provide a 
therapeu tic  place for catharsis and  healing, and  a political space for action.
T he im plications o f Kristeva’s theory  are im portan t. K ant places the 
capacity for creativity, in the biologically d e term in ed  ta len t o f the genius. 
Inna te  ta len t substantiates n o t only the universality o f the work o f a rt and  
the »genius« o f the artist, b u t bolsters a h ierarchy  betw een h u m an  beings 
and  places limits on  their th o u g h t an d  w hat they are able to achieve. K ant’s 
universality o f  art is secured th rough  a p red e te rm in ed  ta len t given only to 
a few. Kristeva rejects this approach . Artistic work provides therapy  fo r an  
individual that is com posed o f the influence o f the universal symbolic realm , 
b u t also retains a u n ique particularity  which m ust be expressed. Individuals 
are n o t lim ited  in w hat they can think, o r restric ted  in the  political struc­
tures o f the symbolic tha t they can seek to change. However, Kristeva also 
recognizes the inescapability o f the sym bolic’s influence in  the construction  
o f the self. A lthough the symbolic has positive aspects, the negative aspects 
o f  the symbolic are purified  th ro u g h  the catharsis o f art fo r an  individual 
who has lost h e r relation to the symbolic and  its m eaning. A lthough Kristeva 
sees an  alarm ing inability for catharsis in the art th a t reflects the chaos o f 
o u r age, Kristeva seeks to preserve the individuality o f the subject and  p ro ­
m ote a political space for change.
13 Kristeva, The Portable Kristeva, Revolution in  Poetic Language 54.
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